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Conversational expectations get revised as response latencies unfold
Sara Bögelsa,b, Kobin H. Kendrickb,c and Stephen C. Levinsona,b
aCentre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; bLanguage and
Cognition Department, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; cDepartment of Language and Linguistic Science,
University of York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
The present study extends neuro-imaging into conversation through studying dialogue comprehension.
Conversation entails rapid responses, with negative semiotics for delay. We explored how expectations
about the valence of the forthcoming response develop during the silence before the response and
whether negative responses have mainly cognitive or social-emotional consequences. EEG-participants
listened to questions from a spontaneous spoken corpus, cross-spliced with short/long gaps and
“yes”/“no” responses. Preceding contexts biased listeners to expect the eventual response, which was
hypothesised to translate to expectations for a shorter or longer gap. “No” responses showed a trend
towards an early positivity, suggesting socio-emotional consequences. Within the long gap, expecting
a “yes” response led to an earlier negativity, as well as a trend towards stronger theta-oscillations,
after 300 milliseconds. This suggests that listeners anticipate/predict “yes” responses to come earlier
than “no” responses, showing strong sensitivities to timing, which presumably promote hastening the
pace of verbal interaction.
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Introduction
The central ecological niche for language, the one in which it
evolved, in which it is acquired, and where it is most used, is
verbal interaction or conversation. But experimental, and
especially neurocognitive approaches to natural language
use of this sort are in their infancy (see Bögels & Levinson,
2017 for review). In earlier work (summarised in Levinson,
2016) we have shown that language processing in this
nichemust in fact interleave comprehension and production
processes. This is because, whereas such language use is
characterised by short turns (around 2 s long on average)
with very short gaps (modally 200 ms) between speakers,
latencies in language production are of the order of
600 ms or more (Levinson & Torreira, 2015). Consequently,
language processing in this environment has to be predic-
tive and expectation driven. Using EEG there are two ways
to show this. One is to look at production processes before
the utterance begins. Thus one can show that, where the
context makes it possible, response preparation starts well
before the prior speaker has ﬁnished his or her turn
(Bögels, Casillas, & Levinson, 2018; Bögels, Magyari, &
Levinson, 2015). The other is to use an overhearer para-
digm, where participants listen to conversational snippets
(see, e.g. Gisladottir, Bögels, & Levinson, 2018; Gisladottir,
Chwilla, & Levinson, 2015), which is the method used in
the study we report here. Note that such an overhearer
paradigm does not directly investigate actual participants
in a conversation, which can be assumed to be the most
natural form of language use, although overhearing also
occurs regularly in daily life, such as in multi-party conver-
sations or “eavesdropping” on a conversation. Still, the
current study goes beyond most earlier research in
terms of ecological validity since it uses auditory materials,
which were taken from a spontaneous corpus of spoken
telephone conversations (see below). Moreover, we
believe it is likely that any eﬀects found in an overhearer
paradigm would be generalisable, or even expected to be
enhanced for actual participants in a dialogue, who are
presumably more invested in the outcomes.
An interesting question is why, despite the cognitive
demands, conversation has this rapid pace. There are a
range of possible answers, including the loss of a
chance to speak, some even related to ethology or phy-
logenetics (see Levinson, 2016). But one thing that
impels speakers is that overlong pauses between turns
seem to have semiotic signiﬁcance, especially when
the ﬁrst turn requires a response, as in the case of ques-
tions, oﬀers, requests, and so on.
For example, when you invite someone to a party, a
silence of, say, one second, might be indicative that
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the response might not be what you hoped for. Or con-
sider how the caller C in this telephone call interprets a
1.86 secs pause as a negative answer to his own question
which he himself voices (Levinson, 1995):
C: So um (0.2) I was wondering would you be in your
oﬃce (0.62) on Monday (0.42) by any chance?
(1.86)
C: Probably not
To avoid such imputations, responses have to be timely.
The present study aims to investigate the interaction
between expectations of response type and their timing.
As implied in the above examples, responses to ques-
tions can be more, or less, cooperative or desirable. Con-
versation-analytic work has described a conversational
system based on two-turn sequences of initiating and
responding actions – such as questions and answers –
which form a large part of day-to-day conversations
(Schegloﬀ, 2007). Within this system, responses can
appear in diﬀerent forms of which some are “preferred”
and others are “dispreferred” (Levinson, 1983). This dis-
tinction refers respectively to unmarked responses that
comply with, or go along with the initiating action on
the one hand, versus those that block or reject the initi-
ating action on the other. For example, preferred
answers to proposals usually entail an acceptance of
the request, whereas rejections are usually dispreferred
(see e.g. Kendrick & Torreira, 2015 for real-life examples
of preferred and dispreferred responses). These two
types of responses generally diﬀer in form (Pomerantz
& Heritage, 2013); dispreferred responses often appear
marked in some way relative to preferred ones, for
example by including hesitations or particles, by being
longer and more complex, by including accounts that
“explain away” the dispreferred response, and most
importantly for the present purposes, by being uttered
after a delay. The latter observation was made in conver-
sation analytic work, both qualitative and quantitative
(Heritage, 1984; Kendrick & Torreira, 2015; Pomerantz,
1984; Stivers & Robinson, 2006). Speciﬁcally, Kendrick
and Torreira (2015) showed that preferred responses to
certain types of questions were generally more frequent
in a corpus of English conversation and especially when
they were preceded by a normal short gap. However,
after a delay of about 700 milliseconds, dispreferred
responses became more frequent. Oﬄine experiments
(Roberts, Francis, & Morgan, 2006; Roberts, Margutti, &
Takano, 2011) also showed that listeners of recorded
(but enacted) telephone conversations judged respon-
ders as “less willing” to comply with a request when
the gap before their positive response was longer. An
interesting possible implication of these corpus and
oﬄine ﬁndings is that listeners in a conversation could
make use of gap lengths on-line: the longer the gap
lasts, the higher the chances become that the answer
will be dispreferred.
Bögels, Kendrick, and Levinson (2015) ﬁrst investi-
gated the question whether listeners can indeed make
on-line use of this information, using an EEG paradigm.
They presented participants with the same kinds of initi-
ating actions investigated in the corpus study described
above (Kendrick & Torreira, 2015), namely requests, invi-
tations, proposals, and oﬀers. Importantly, these initiat-
ing actions were taken from a corpus of spoken Dutch,
ensuring their ecological validity. These initiating
actions were paired with two types of responses: pre-
ferred responses and dispreferred responses. For the pur-
poses of that study, preferred responses were
conveniently operationalised as “yes” and dispreferred
responses as “no” (naturally, there are further alternatives
and elaborations to be found in natural conversation). In
some cases, “no” can serve as a preferred response, as in
response to the following example: “You never had any
regrets, have you?” (Kendrick & Holler, 2017, Table 1;
see also Heritage, 2010). However, the initiating actions
taken from the corpus were all of such form that they
preferred a positive (“yes”) response.
Crucially, the timing of these responses was manipu-
lated; they either occurred after a normal, short gap of
300 milliseconds or after a long gap of 1000 milliseconds.
Two interesting ERP results emerged. First, a larger N400
was found for “no” than for “yes” responses, but only
after the short gap. Thus, listeners expected preferred
rather than dispreferred responses after short gaps, but
this expectancy diﬀerence disappeared after long gaps,
indicating that the long gap changed the expectation of
the response. Second, a larger anterior late positivity for
“no” responses (roughly between 500 and 800 ms) was
found irrespective of the gap length. The authors related
this eﬀect to the possible social disaﬃliativeness of a
plain “no” answer without an account (e.g. an explanation
for the refusal or rejection), which might be perceived as
rude by participants.1 However, it was unclear whether
the positivity reﬂected mainly cognitive consequences
of the plain “no”, such as searching for an account, or
whether it reﬂected more socio-emotional processes.
Thus, the study described above showed that longer
gaps aﬀected listeners’ expectations for preferred vs. dis-
preferred responses, with longer gaps making an upcom-
ing dispreferred response subjectively more likely.
However, it did not investigate the processing of expec-
tations during the gap itself.
The ﬁrst aim of the present study is to investigate
listener’s expectations during the gap. To this end, we
measured the brain’s response to lengthening gaps
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within the silence itself, while contexts were presented to
participants right before the auditory sequences. These
contexts aimed to bias participants to expect the response
that they would eventually hear (preferred or dispreferred;
see Materials section and Figure 1 below). Thus creating
an a priori expectation for a certain upcoming response,
we can see whether this in turn leads to an expectation
for a shorter (in the case of preferred responses) or
longer gap (in the case of dispreferred responses).2
We have no clear hypotheses about the speciﬁc neur-
onal instantiations of this interaction, given that it would
be measured within the gap (silence) and most previous
EEG research measured EEG responses to auditory or
visual stimuli. For that reason, we analysed the EEG
measurements during the long gap using both ERP
and time-frequency analyses, which have been shown
to reveal complementary aspects of processing (e.g.
Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004).
A second aim of the present study is to shed more
light on the late positivity found before (Bögels, Ken-
drick, et al., 2015). This was interpreted as related to
the fact that the “no” response was presented
Figure 1. Examples of the biasing context presented before the mini-dialogues; biased towards a preferred response (panel A) and
towards a dispreferred response (panel B). The speaker icon indicates which speaker starts the target sequence (see, e.g. Table 1).
Note that the original text was in Dutch (see Table 1); the English translation was inserted in the ﬁgure for readability.
LANGUAGE, COGNITION AND NEUROSCIENCE 3
without an account. In the present study, “no”
responses are always preceded by a biasing context
in which an account is given in advance for the dispre-
ferred response (see Tables 1 and 2 for examples).
Thus, if the late anterior positivity was only a reﬂection
of the fact that the participants did not know the
account for the dispreferred answer, it should disap-
pear in the present study because an explanation is
present in the prior contexts we have provided. In con-
trast, if the eﬀect is at least partly also a reﬂection of
the social or emotional consequences of a plain “no”
(e.g. it being perceived as rude), some eﬀect should
still be found for “no” relative to “yes” responses.
Note that the N400 eﬀect found for dispreferred rela-
tive to preferred responses after a short gap is not
hypothesised to be replicated in the present study,
since the biasing context creates a strong expectation
for a “no” response in that condition which would pre-
sumably override the expectation based on the general
preference for “yes”.
Materials and methods
Participants
The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee
Social Sciences of the Radboud University Nijmegen.
Thirty-six participants (8 males) from the database of
the MPI for Psycholinguistics took part in the experiment.
Four were excluded from the ﬁnal analysis, one due to
experimenter error, one due to excessive artefacts, and
two due to a break-down of ocular electrodes. The 32
remaining participants (7 males) were 22.6 years old on
average, right handed, and native speakers of Dutch
without reading or hearing problems. They were paid
10 euros per hour for their participation.
Materials
The auditory materials were taken from an earlier
study (Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015) and consisted of
mini-dialogues containing an initiating and a responding
Table 1. Example of one item (request) in Dutch, with English translations, including the text in the context pictures (see Figure 1)
preceding the question and an example of a comprehension statement that followed in 20% of trials. Underlined text was
presented in thinking balloons.
Shared context (written:
speaking balloons)
Continuation (written: thinking
balloons) Initiating action (auditory) Gap Response Statement (task)
B: Mitch en ik zijn erg
benieuwd naar je nieuwe
huis. “Mitch and I are
very curious about your
new house.”
A: Ja, jullie moeten zeker
een keer komen kijken.
“Yes, you should
certainly come over
some time to see it.”
Preferred:
B: Liefst volgende week pas, want dan
ben ik niet meer zo druk met mijn
nieuwe baan. “I would prefer next
week, because I am a bit less busy
with my new job then.”
Dispreferred:
B: Volgende week ben ik druk met
mijn nieuwe baan, maar een keer
daarna lijkt me gezellig. “Next week, I
am busy with my new job, but some
time after that would be nice.”
Request:
A: heb je volgende week nog
een uh een moment om ons te
ontvangen? “Do you have a uh
a moment next week to
receive us?”
300 ms/ 1000 ms ja “yes”/nee “no”
De spreker wil graag
vandaag nog bij de
ander op bezoek. “The
speaker would like to
visit the other person
today.”
Table 2. Three additional examples of an invitation, oﬀer, and proposal (English translations).
Type Shared context Preferred continuation Dispreferred continuation Question
Invitation A: On Saturday, I am going
shopping in Amsterdam.
B: Yes, that is what you said
yesterday.
B: I always like Amsterdam, so many
special shops and interesting
people.
B: I ﬁnd Amsterdam so busy,
especially in weekends.
A: “But I thought, would you like
to come along?”
Oﬀer A: Good to hear you ﬁnished
painting your house. Shall we
have dinner together tonight?
B: Yes, I am a bit tired of
painting, but that sounds nice,
Pieter.
B: I just don’t have any energy left
to cook, so I hope I can enjoy
Pieter’s good cooking skills.
B: Luckily I have some energy left to
cook, because I have bad
experiences with Pieter’s cooking.
A: “And then, eh, shall I cook for
you?”
Proposal B: I really worked for long today. B: It was a waste to sit inside the
whole day, it is such a lovely
summer day today.
B: I am quite tired from it, so I will go
to bed soon because I have to
wake up early tomorrow.
A: “Yes, by the way, would you
still like to go for an evening
walk or something?”
Note: Underlined text was presented in thinking balloons, the rest of the context was presented in text balloons. The question (and response) was always pre-
sented auditorily.
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action. The initiating actions were requests, oﬀers, propo-
sals, and invitations (see Couper-Kuhlen, 2014) taken
from the telephone conversations of the Corpus of
Spoken Dutch (CGN; Oostdijk, 2000). These actions
impressionistically sounded intonationally and pragmati-
cally complete (Ford & Thompson, 1996), required a con-
ditionally relevant response (Schegloﬀ, 2007) and were
not biased towards a negative response (Heritage,
2010). See Tables 1 and 2 for examples. The responding
actions consisted of 30 ja (“yes”) and 30 nee (“no”) tokens
also taken from the CGN, but they were never the orig-
inal responses to any of the initiating actions used.
Each of the 120 initiating actions could appear in four
diﬀerent conditions: ﬁrst followed by either 300 ms or
1000 ms of background noise from the same recording,
then followed by either a ja or a nee response token.
The initiating action and the response were always pre-
sented in diﬀerent audio channels. Ja and nee tokens
from speakers of the same gender were paired up and
each pair was coupled to four initiating actions (in
diﬀerent conditions). As a result, each participant heard
every response token only twice (see Design).
For the purpose of the present experiment, contexts
in the form of pictures were also created to be presented
before the auditory mini-dialogues (see Figure 1 for dia-
grammatic examples and Table 2 for three more
examples presented with text only). The pictures con-
tained stylised cartoon images of the speakers in the
conversation (diﬀerent images for male and female
speakers), speaking balloons, and “thinking balloons”,
indicating what the two dialogue partners said and
thought, respectively, just before they would utter the
mini-dialogue. A loudspeaker icon placed next to one
of the speaker’s images (see Figure 1, bottom) indicated
which of them would start speaking ﬁrst in the auditory
fragment. For each initiating action, two diﬀerent con-
texts were created in such a way that the ﬁrst context
biased participants to expect a preferred (“yes”) answer
to the auditorily presented initiating action (i.e. “pre-
ferred context”, see example in Figure 1, panel A) and
the second context biased participants to expect a dis-
preferred (“no”) answer to this action (i.e. “dispreferred
context”, see example in Figure 1, panel B). To ensure
that the contexts indeed fulﬁlled these criteria, we per-
formed a web-based pre-test in which 43 participants
saw the context images, followed by the initiating
action played auditorily when they pressed a button.
Two lists were created (21–22 participants per list),
both containing all initiating actions with half of them
preceded by preferred and the other half preceded by
dispreferred contexts. This was reversed in the second
list. Participants were asked to indicate on a Likert scale
from 1 to 7 how positive they thought the response to
the initiating action would be. Responses with response
times below 200 ms or above 20 s were removed (0.27%
of the data). Preferred contexts were clearly judged to
lead to a more positive response (M = 6.23) than dispre-
ferred contexts (M = 2.06, t = 123.02, p < .001). Only three
dispreferred contexts had an average score above 3 and
two preferred contexts had an average score below
5. These ﬁve contexts were subsequently changed to
provide a stronger bias before using them in the EEG
experiment.
For the practice block, ten initiating actions (sugges-
tions and requests for information) that could receive a
“yes” or “no” response were taken from the earlier
study as well (Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015). Half were fol-
lowed by the original ja or nee response from the corpus
and half were followed randomly by between 0 and
1000 ms of background noise and a cross-spliced
response. For each of the 10 practice items a biasing
context (picture) was created that biased participants
to expect the response they would hear.
Design
The two factors gap duration (300, 1000 ms) and
response type (“yes”, “no”) were fully crossed to create
four conditions. Contexts always matched the response;
thus, preferred contexts were always followed by “yes”
responses and dispreferred contexts by “no” responses.
Four lists were created, all administered to one fourth
of the participants. Each list contained all 120 items
once, in the same order, 30 in each condition. The con-
ditions were rotated over the items in the four lists
using a Latin Square design. The 120 items were
divided into three blocks of 40 items, with pauses in
between. Each block contained 10 items of each con-
dition in a semi-random order, with the following restric-
tions. The same response token extracted from a
particular recording was always separated by at least
four items and occurred only twice in each list. Initiating
actions coming from the same telephone conversation
were separated by at least three items. The same con-
dition appeared maximally twice in a row.
Procedure
After having given written informed consent and receiv-
ing EEG preparation, participants sat down in a sound
proof booth in front of a computer screen. They read
the instructions on the screen and could ask questions
afterwards. They were instructed that they would hear
fragments from a corpus of telephone calls. They were
told that fragments had been selected in which the
speakers were making plans and in which the response
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was “yes” or “no”. The context they would see before
each auditory fragment was also introduced and
explained to them. See Appendix A for an English trans-
lation of the exact (Dutch) written instructions given to
participants.
In each trial, participants ﬁrst saw the context picture
on the screen which they could view at their own con-
venience. They then pressed a button to continue. A
ﬁxation cross appeared and after 1000 ms the fragment
played. One second after the end of the fragment, the
ﬁxation cross disappeared. For 20% of the items (and
50% of the practice items) this was followed by a
written statement. See Table 1 for an example. Partici-
pants indicated whether they thought the statement
was true (left button) or false (right button). On
average, only 1.8 (out of 25) statements were responded
to incorrectly (range: 0–6), indicating that participants
paid attention during the experiment. Finally, a blinking
sign was presented on the screen for 2000ms. Partici-
pants were asked to blink during the blinking sign, but
to try not to move, blink, or move their eyes while the
ﬁxation cross was on the screen.
The experiment started with a practice block of 10
items, after which participants could ask questions and
received feedback about their blinking. The practice
and the three experimental blocks together lasted
about 50 min. At the end of the experiment, participants
ﬁlled out a short questionnaire on the computer. In this
questionnaire, none of the participants reported to
notice anything with regards to timing of responses.
After this, they received a debrieﬁng about the way the
stimuli were created and the purpose of the experiment.
The experiment, including EEG set-up, lasted about two
hours in total.
Apparatus
EEG was recorded from 61 active Ag/AgCI electrodes
using an actiCap (e.g. Bögels, Magyari, et al., 2015).
Of these, 59 electrodes were mounted in the cap
with equidistant electrode montage referenced to
the left mastoid. Two separate electrodes were
placed at the left and the right mastoid outside of
the cap. Blinks were monitored through a separate
electrode placed below the left eye and one of the
59 electrodes in the cap. Horizontal eye movements
were monitored through two separate electrodes
placed at each outer canthus. The ground electrode
was placed on the forehead. Electrode impedance
was kept below 10 kΩ. EEG and EOG recordings
were ampliﬁed through BrainAmp DC ampliﬁers. EEG
signals were ﬁltered online with a band-pass ﬁlter
between 0.016 and 100 Hz. The recording was
digitised online with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz
and stored for oﬄine analysis.
Data analysis
Pre-processing and statistical analysis of EEG data was
conducted using Fieldtrip (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, &
Schoﬀelen, 2011). First, epochs were extracted from the
EEG from 500 ms before the oﬀset of the initiating
action until 1000 ms after response onset. For purposes
of artefact rejection, these epochs were ﬁltered with a
low pass ﬁlter of 35 Hz, detrended, and baselined at
the last 200 ms before the gap (i.e. during the last
200 ms of the initiating action). Epochs containing eye
artefacts or other artefacts that exceeded about
+/−100 μV (visual inspection) were discarded. For the
participants that entered the analysis, an average of
27–28 out of 30 trials (range: 19–30) remained for all
four conditions. Two diﬀerent epochs were extracted
for the ERP and time-frequency analyses, one time-
locked at gap onset and one time-locked at response
onset. For ERP analyses epochs were low-pass ﬁltered
at 35 Hz and baselined at 0–200 ms relative to gap
onset and at −200–0 ms relative to response onset,
respectively. Trials of the same condition were averaged
per participant. For time-frequency representations, no
ﬁltering or baselining was performed, but a linear trend
was removed from the data before the analysis. The
power of each frequency between 4 and 30 Hz (with
steps of 1 Hz) was calculated on the extracted epochs
of individual trials using a Hanning taper (Grandke,
1983) with a window of 500 ms for each frequency. For
illustration purposes, relative diﬀerences were calculated
between conditions, dividing the absolute power diﬀer-
ence between conditions by the sum of the power in
both conditions (see Figure 4).
To test for statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
conditions, we used the cluster-based approach
implemented in the Fieldtrip toolbox (Maris & Oosten-
veld, 2007). This robust method reduces the multiple-
comparisons problem and controls family-wise error
across subjects in time and space. To examine diﬀer-
ences between experimental conditions, paired t-tests
are performed for each time-point, channel, and fre-
quency (for time-frequency analyses) with a threshold
of .05. All time, channel, and frequency (for time-fre-
quency analyses) points below the threshold are selected
and clustered. Clusters in time, space, and frequency are
identiﬁed on the basis of proximity of the points (neigh-
bours) in all dimensions of the cluster. Cluster statistics
are calculated by taking the sum of t-values in every
cluster. To obtain a p-value for each cluster, a Monte
Carlo method is used to estimate the permutation
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distribution of the largest cluster statistic. The permu-
tation distribution is created by 1000 random permu-
tations of the samples of the two conditions. At each
randomisation, clusters are identiﬁed and the largest
sum of t-values of the clusters enters the permutation
distribution. The proportion of maximum cluster stat-
istics of the permutation distribution that is larger than
the observed one is the p-value. The threshold was
ﬁxed to p = .05. The time-locking point at response
onset was analysed with ERPs only, for comparison to
the earlier results (Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015). We
used a similar approach as that study, ﬁrst testing for
interactions between gap duration and response type.
Within the cluster-based approach, this was done by cal-
culating the mean diﬀerence between the “yes” and “no”
responses for each participant within the 300 and
1000 ms gap conditions. Then the cluster-based
approach was used on these diﬀerence scores with the
within-subject factor gap duration in a time window
between 0 and 1000 ms. In the case of an interaction,
separate analyses were performed to compare “yes”
and “no” responses within the 300 and 1000 ms gap con-
ditions. In addition, the short and long gap conditions
were collapsed to look for main eﬀects of response
type. For the time-locking point at gap onset, we com-
pared the two conditions containing long gaps using
both ERP and time-frequency analyses. We analysed a
window of interest between 0 and 1000 ms to explore
any eﬀects that might occur within the long gap. Further-
more, we analysed a window between 300 and 500 ms,
because we expected any eﬀects to occur soon after par-
ticipants could ﬁrst notice that this is a long gap. This
reasoning was based on the fact that inter-turn gaps
around 200–300 ms are most frequent in conversation
(e.g. Heldner & Edlund, 2010) so longer gaps could be
considered “long”. More speciﬁcally, in the present
experiment, gaps were always either 300 or 1000 ms
long, so participants might implicitly learn that gaps
longer than 300 ms are always long gaps. Since we did
not expect main eﬀects of context (our design was not
built to ﬁnd those, see footnote 2), but were interested
in the moment at which information about the context
would be integrated with the length of the gap, the
most relevant time window is the one just after listeners
realise that the gap is long (i.e. between 300 and 500 ms
after long gap onset).
Results and discussion
Response onset
Figure 2, panels A and B, show grand average waveforms
time-locked to response onset for “yes” and “no”
responses (preceded by preferred and dispreferred con-
texts, respectively) after a short (300 ms, panel A) and
after a long gap (1000 ms, panel B). Two diﬀerences
seem apparent, an early centroparietal negative eﬀect
and a somewhat later, mostly anterior positive eﬀect
for “no” relative to “yes” responses. Since an interaction
analysis for 0–1000 ms on the diﬀerence values
between “yes” and “no” responses showed no inter-
actions between gap length and response type (p > .4),
we collapsed the 300 and 1000 ms gap conditions to
look at the main eﬀect of response type. This analysis
yielded one cluster reﬂecting the early negative eﬀect
for “no” vs. “yes” responses with a centroparietal distri-
bution (117–322 ms. p = .003; see topographical plot in
Figure 2, panel C) and a later marginally signiﬁcant posi-
tive eﬀect for “no” vs. “yes” responses with a mostly
anterior distribution (312–456 ms, p = .075; see topogra-
phical plot in Figure 2, panel D). See Figure 2, panel E for
diﬀerence waves between the two “yes” and “no”
responses collapsed over the two gap lengths.
Given its early onset, the ﬁrst, negative eﬀect for “no”
relative to “yes” responses could be explained by rela-
tively low-level diﬀerences between these lexical items,
for example in frequency ( ja (“yes”) is much more fre-
quent than nee (“no”) in the spoken corpus used to
extract the materials; Oostdijk, 2000). Therefore, we
should be cautious to interpret this eﬀect and we can
only speculate about its cause here. Early eﬀects of fre-
quency starting around 150 ms have been reported
(Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Sereno, Rayner, & Posner,
1998), where low-frequency words also led to a more
negative waveform at posterior sites. However, in these
earlier studies, the negative eﬀects for low-frequency
words were mostly found on negative peaks, whereas in
the present study, the eﬀect seems largest on a positive
peak. An alternative explanation might be that “no”
responses lead to a small early residual N400 eﬀect. The
early onset might not be too surprising given that the
earlier study using the same materials but without
biasing contexts (Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015) also
found a very early starting N400 to unexpected “no”
responses (after 300 ms gaps, with a non-signiﬁcant sug-
gestion in the same direction after 1000 ms gaps, see
Figure 2 of that paper). Although in the current exper-
iment, both responses should be expected based on the
biasing contexts, it is possible that the general preference
for “yes” responses adds to the contextual bias, still
leading to a small N400 eﬀect for “no” relative to “yes”
responses. This N400-eﬀect does not persist to the stan-
dard N400 window, which might be due to an overlap
with the following positivity (see below).
The trend towards a somewhat later anterior positivity
for “no” responses is, although found in a similar time
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Figure 2. Grand average waveforms time-locked to response onset after a 300 ms gap (panel A) and a 1000 ms gap (panel B) for “yes”
responses (black dotted line) and “no” responses (red line). A representative subset of 15 electrodes is shown, the locations of which are
indicated on the small head at the middle right of each panel. Panels C and D show distribution plots of diﬀerences in grand average
waveforms between “no” and “yes” responses for the two windows in which a (marginally) signiﬁcant eﬀect was found. Electrodes that
are signiﬁcant (in panel C) or marginally signiﬁcant (in panel D) in at least 50% of the time window are highlighted in white. Panel E
shows diﬀerence waves for “no” minus “yes” responses for two representative electrodes, the locations of which are indicated on the
small head.
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window, opposite in polarity to the N400-eﬀect found in
the earlier study (Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015). Given
that this positivity was only a trend, we have to interpret
it with caution here. However, assuming that it reﬂects a
relevant diﬀerence and would be replicated in future
studies, it might be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways:
(1) as a new eﬀect, not present in the earlier study
(Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015) or (2) as an earlier instan-
tiation of the late positivity found in that study. Under
the ﬁrst interpretation, the late positivity found earlier
(Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015) disappeared in the
present study, presumably because an account was
now given in the context. In that case, that late positivity
(Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015) might be explained purely
by the search for an account. The early positivity found in
the present study might then still (perhaps like the earlier
negativity) be due to a low-level diﬀerence between
“yes” and “no”, for example in frequency. In the 300–
500 ms window where the positivity is found, studies
on word frequency have found conﬂicting results.
Some found a larger P300 for frequent than infrequent
words (Polich & Donchin, 1988) or a larger N400 for infre-
quent than frequent words (Rugg, 1990; Van Petten &
Kutas, 1990), which are incompatible with the present
results, given their polarity. Hauk and Pulvermüller
(2004) instead found a larger positivity for infrequent
than frequent words between 320 and 360 ms, but
that eﬀect had a centroparietal peak, unlike the
present anterior positive eﬀect. Alternatively, the positiv-
ity might be interpreted as a general P300-like eﬀect,
reﬂecting some “surprise” at encountering a (plain)
“no” response, even if a dispreferred response can be
expected based on the context. Future research should
try to disentangle the eﬀects of “yes” versus “no” and
preferred versus dispreferred responses by including
questions that prefer a “no” answer.
The second interpretation, namely that the frontal
positivity found here is an earlier instantiation of the
late positivity found in the earlier study (Bögels, Ken-
drick, et al., 2015), might be corroborated by a similar
frontal distribution of the two eﬀects. Interestingly,
ERP studies on comprehension of morally unacceptable
statements or behaviour have also found fronto-central
positivities, with onsets ranging between 320 and
500 ms (Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, & Filik, 2015;
Van Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre,
2009) and emotional stimuli have been found to elicit
fronto-central positive shifts starting around 300 ms
(for a review, see Fischler & Bradley, 2006). The fact
that the positivity in the present study occurs relatively
early (and earlier than in Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015),
might be due to a strong expectedness of the response
given the 100% predictive context which enables
participants to know in advance which response is
forthcoming. This interpretation entails that a frontal
positivity for “no” responses cannot be fully explained
by the eﬀects of having to come up with an account
for a dispreferred response, but that socio-emotional
consequences of the rudeness of a plain “no” may
also play a role here.
Gap onset
Figure 3, panel A, presents grand average ERP waveforms
time-locked to gap onset for the two 1000 ms gap con-
ditions. The black dashed line represents the condition
preceded by a preferred context and the red line rep-
resents the condition preceded by a dispreferred
context. Both conditions show a positive deﬂection
with a maximum around 300 ms. Furthermore, the dis-
preferred context condition appears to go a bit more
positive and stay positive longer than preferred context
condition (see Figure 3, panel C for diﬀerence waves
between dispreferred and preferred contexts at a repre-
sentative electrode). A cluster-analysis between 0 and
1000 ms showed no signiﬁcant eﬀects (ps > .12), but
the same analysis between 300 and 500 ms showed a
signiﬁcant eﬀect between 404 and 500 ms (p = .033),
with the dispreferred context going more positive than
the preferred context (see also the topographical plot
in Figure 3 panel B). Given that these two conditions
consist of exactly the same auditory input up to and
including the gap (same initiating action plus a silent
gap), this ﬁnding of a diﬀerence between the two con-
ditions within the gap, indicates that the context which
was presented a few seconds earlier leads to expec-
tations that interact with the gap duration. This suggests
that the expectation for a preferred or dispreferred
response leads listeners to interpret the gap diﬀerently.
This speciﬁc eﬀect found here, the greater positive
shift in the dispreferred condition, might be interpreted
with regards to the anticipation of an upcoming stimu-
lus. The ERPs in Figure 4 are going towards negative
from about 400 ms in both conditions, which might indi-
cate that listeners anticipate the upcoming response
they will hear. The CNV or contingent negative variation
(CNV; Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, McCallum, & Winter,
1964) related to the “Bereitschaftspotential” (Kornhuber
& Deecke, 1965) is a slow negative-going potential occur-
ring when participants anticipate an upcoming motor
response or stimulus (for a review, see Kononowicz &
Penney, 2016). Such negative shifts, with variable distri-
butions, have been related both to motor preparation
(if a response has to be performed) and to anticipation
of a meaningful stimulus (Van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004;
Van Boxtel & Brunia, 1994). In the latter case, eﬀects
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have also been termed stimulus preceding negativity
(SPN). The negative shift visible in Figure 3 in several
electrodes in both conditions could be interpreted as
such an SPN. The fact that the dispreferred context
(red line) leads to a larger positivity could be interpreted
in terms of an SPN that starts later, leading to a net posi-
tivity. A later SPN would indicate that listeners are not
anticipating a response as quickly after a dispreferred
context biasing them to expect a “no” response than
after a preferred context biasing them to expect a “yes”
response. In other words, listeners strongly expect a
“yes” response soon after the ﬁrst 300 ms of the gap
have ended, whereas their expectation for a “no”
response builds up only later on in the gap. Note that
we are not interpreting the eﬀect we ﬁnd here as a viola-
tion of an expectation for a short gap after a preferred
context. At ﬁrst sight, one might have expected such a
violation response because of the mismatch between
the long gap and an expected “yes” response. Indeed,
observational studies (e.g. Kendrick & Torreira, 2015)
Figure 3. Panel A shows grand average waveforms time-locked to gap onset after a 1000 ms gap for gaps preceded by preferred con-
texts (black dotted line) and gaps preceded by dispreferred contexts (red line). A representative subset of 15 electrodes is shown, the
locations of which are indicated on the head at the middle right of the panel. Panel B shows a distribution plot of diﬀerences in grand
average waveforms between “no” and “yes” responses for the window in which a signiﬁcant eﬀect was found. Electrodes that are sig-
niﬁcant in at least 50% of the time window are highlighted in white. Panel C shows diﬀerence waves for “no” minus “yes” responses for
a representative electrode, the location of which is indicated on the small head.
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suggest the existence of some kind of threshold around
600 ms, after which dispreferred responses become
more frequent than preferred ones. However, the eﬀect
we ﬁnd occurs much earlier than 600 ms into the gap.
Moreover, one would expect that the relative pro-
portions of preferred vs. dispreferred responses (and
consequently the expectations of participants) do not
reverse abruptly, but rather change more gradually as
the gap unfolds, making one time-locked mismatch
response quite unlikely.
A time-frequency analysis between 4 and 30 Hz and
between 0 and 1000 ms showed a marginally signiﬁcant
larger power in the theta frequency for preferred con-
texts relative to dispreferred contexts within the
1000 ms gap (p = .09, see Figure 4). The eﬀect started
around 200 ms in some electrodes and lasted up to
around 800 ms, with a distribution that was maximal in
central areas. This eﬀect can be viewed as a trend for a
relative increase in theta power during long gaps when
a preferred rather than a dispreferred response is
expected. Given the weakness of this eﬀect, it has to
be replicated by future studies before we can be more
certain about its relevance. Nevertheless, we oﬀer some
speculative interpretations here.
Theta has been related to language processing, with
for example power increases when participants are pro-
cessing open class words, possibly due to retrieving
lexico-semantic information of words (e.g. Bastiaansen,
Linden, Keurs, Dijkstra, & Hagoort, 2005). Stronger theta
oscillations have also been found in response to seman-
tic violations (Hagoort et al., 2004). Although no
language input is present within the gap in either con-
dition, as mentioned in the introduction, observations
of conversational behaviour suggest that response
timing itself has semiotic signiﬁcance. Thus the
ongoing silence itself might also be viewed as
Figure 4. Time-frequency results in the 1000 ms gap. Panel A shows relative diﬀerences of grand average time-frequency represen-
tations after a preferred context relative to a dispreferred context, time-locked to gap onset (or question oﬀset). The solid colours indi-
cate marginally signiﬁcant eﬀects (in theta). A representative subset of 15 electrodes is shown (for locations, see Figure 3). Panel B
shows a topographical plot of the theta eﬀect (5–9 Hz) between 300 and 500 ms. Electrodes with marginally signiﬁcant eﬀects in
at least 30% of the time window are highlighted in white.
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meaningful information that has to be processed and
integrated with the context. In the case that listeners
expect a “yes” response based on the context, the semio-
tics of the silence they hear (after some time) might be
more diﬃcult to integrate with their current expectations
and might thus be interpreted as a kind of “semantic, or
at least semiotic, violation”. Note that oscillatory
changes might be more suited to detect a “violation”
eﬀect here than ERPs because we assume that the vio-
lation would not be time-locked to one speciﬁc pos-
ition but would build up over time. Alternatively, the
theta eﬀect might be related to predictive processing
of the upcoming speech during the gap. An MEG
study (Dikker & Pylkkänen, 2013) compared written
words that were rendered predictable by a preceding
picture of the object described by that word, with
words rendered unpredictable by a preceding picture
of a whole class of objects. They found increased
theta power in occipital areas immediately before pre-
dictable relative to unpredictable words. Another MEG
study (Bastiaansen, Magyari, & Hagoort, 2010) found a
linear increase in theta power across syntactically struc-
tured sentences (see also, e.g. Bastiaansen, Van
Berkum, & Hagoort, 2002). Although it was interpreted
diﬀerently, such a theta increase potentially corre-
sponds to an increase in contextual constraint, allowing
for stronger prediction of the next word. Assuming this
can be generalised to the auditory modality (although
probably in diﬀerent brain areas), a similar process
could be going on in the present study. Listeners pre-
sumably predict a certain response (either “yes” or
“no”) in both conditions, based on the context.
However, predictions about the timing of these
responses might diﬀer. If listeners predict the “yes”
response to appear earlier, theta power might increase
at an earlier point within the long gap (i.e. just before
the word is predicted) than in the case of a predicted
“no” response, which might not be predicted until after
a longer gap. Thus, in this latter interpretation, a theta
enhancement within in the gap after preferred con-
texts suggests that prediction of a preferred upcoming
response starts earlier and/or is stronger than predic-
tion of a dispreferred upcoming response.
Conclusion
The present experiment looked at listeners’ expectations
of the timing of diﬀerent types of responses. We biased
listeners’ expectations for preferred or dispreferred
responses using a contextual manipulation. The late
positivity found by Bögels, Kendrick, et al. (2015) for
plain “no” responses was not replicated fully when a
reason for a rejection was given beforehand, suggesting
that at least part of this earlier ﬁnding was caused by
searching for an account for the dispreferred response.
On the other hand, we did ﬁnd a trend towards an
earlier positivity for plain “no” responses, even if the
account was clear, so we cannot exclude any socio-
emotional eﬀects of the rudeness of a plain “no”.
Furthermore, we showed that biasing contexts appear
to aﬀect listeners’ expectations for the timing of pre-
ferred and dispreferred responses. That is, listeners
appeared to expect upcoming responses earlier in the
long gap when they were preferred than when they
were dispreferred. Dispreferred responses showed a
later stimulus preceding negativity as well as a trend
towards a weaker theta eﬀect which suggests delayed
prediction of incoming speech material.
The eﬀects found in the present study appeared very
subtle. This is not very surprising if one considers the fol-
lowing. In the experiment, two main sources informed
listeners’ expectations about the response, namely
context and gap length. Of these two, context can gen-
erally be expected to be a stronger cue (although that
has not been tested to our knowledge), because it is
more explicit and has fewer alternative explanations
(e.g. a longer pause could also be due to the responder
being distracted). Moreover, context was 100% reliable,
whereas gap length was not informative at all within
the experiment. Since all the reported eﬀects hinge cru-
cially on a role of gap length (in interaction with, or on
top of contextual cues) in anticipating responses, it can
be expected that the eﬀects are modest. Other types of
paradigms are needed to show the relative importance
of diﬀerent cues on their own and in diﬀerent combi-
nations. Finding any eﬀects at all shows that gap
length is relevant to listeners, even under these non-
ideal circumstances. Furthermore, the participants in
this experiment were overhearers of a conversation. It
can be expected that eﬀects will be larger for actual par-
ticipants in a conversation, because they are presumably
more motivated to anticipate the upcoming response
which is much more relevant for them personally. Still,
the subtlety of the eﬀects, together with the exploratory
nature of the present study, makes it imperative that
these results are replicated in future research (preferably
in interactive situations as well).
Thus, importantly, our study suggests that the proces-
sing of conversation involves the generation of expec-
tations about upcoming responses and the timeliness
with which they will be delivered. Even during an unfold-
ing gap, expectations appear to be revised in line with
the lengthening silence, demonstrating the dynamic
nature of comprehension. It thus throws further light
on how language is processed in its “home” ecological
niche, conversation.
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Notes
1. Since the late positive eﬀect manifested as a main eﬀect
between “no” and “yes” responses, two alternative expla-
nations for the eﬀect were discussed in the paper, but
deemed unlikely (Bögels, Kendrick, et al., 2015, pp.
11–12). First, a base frequency eﬀect (“yes” is more fre-
quent than “no” in spoken corpora) seems unlikely
because frequency eﬀects in earlier studies had an oppo-
site direction (e.g. Polich & Donchin, 1988) or were found
to occur earlier and at more posterior sites (e.g. Sereno
et al., 1998). Second, eﬀects related to semantic diﬃculties
of negation have been shown to largely disappear when
pragmatically licenced (Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008).
2. Note that this study was not designed to investigate the
brain’s response to the realization that the upcoming
response would be preferred versus dispreferred, as
anticipated from the context. Our stimuli (partly consist-
ing of natural questions) presumably diﬀer quite a bit in
when exactly participants would be able to start antici-
pating the response. In some cases, the context alone
will provide enough information to anticipate the type
of response, in other cases, part or all of the question is
also needed (see Tables 1 and 2 for examples of
diﬀerent contexts and questions). Thus, we do not
expect to see an eﬀect of the anticipation of a certain
type of response per se. Rather, we are interested in a
potential interaction between the context information
and the length of the gap, which we might observe
within long gaps.
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